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The interest among academics and policy makers in the economics of gambling
has risen substantially. Changes in gambling regulation, the relevance of gambling
generated (tax) revenues and the usefulness to other fields of economics, increased
the interest in understanding gambling demand. The focus of this paper is to pro-
vide one of the first comprehensive analyses of gambling demand in Germany, by
studying the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors which influence gam-
bling expenditures using one of the largest data sets available, the official income
and consumption survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe).
Applying models suitable for censored data, we identify the factors influencing gam-
bling demand. Some findings are in line with the previous literature on gambling de-
mand, others are quite surprising. They show that female household heads spend less
on gambling than their male counterparts. The number of dependants in the house-
hold influences gambling behaviour negatively, while married couples have higher
expenditures than single person households. We find that while gambling expen-
ditures increase with the age of the household head, they do so at a diminishing
rate. Income is also a strong determinant of gambling expenditure. Gambling ex-
penditures rise with the household’s income. We find no evidence that expenditures
increase regressively. Furthermore, the education and occupation of the household
head influences gambling behaviour. A higher education has a negative effect on
the propensity to gamble. We also find that households with privately employed
household heads tend to spend more on gambling than those with unemployed or
self-employed household heads. On the other hand, a household head who is a civil
servant or retired has a positive effect. In contrast to previous literature, we find a
negative effect of urbanity on household gambling expenditure.
We discuss these and other results in the context of the theory of risk taking pref-
erences and also with a focus on gambling regulation and taxation.
i
1 Introduction
In recent years, the interest among academics and policy makers in the economics of
gambling has risen substantially. Changes in gambling regulation, the relevance of
gambling generated (tax) revenues and the usefulness to other fields of economics,
increased the interest in understanding gambling demand. The focus of this paper
is to study the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors which influence gam-
bling expenditures. The analysis of the determinants of gambling behaviour is of
interest to researchers in the field of politics, economics as well as psychology.
The results of this paper hold implications for many policy issues related to gam-
bling. First, socio-economic factors determining gambling behaviour of individuals
are of importance for policy initiatives which deal with preventive measures to fight
gambling addiction. Second, the question whether gambling is socially desirable or
not is controversial in most countries. There exists a trade-off between the positive
effects of tax revenues generated by gambling and the possible negative externalities
gambling causes. Additionally, the results of this paper can shed light on the ongo-
ing discussion of whether or not the taxation of gambling products might actually
be a form of regressive taxation rather than a redistribution benefiting the socially
disadvantaged.
Furthermore, some researchers have linked gambling behaviour to risk attitudes.
Mishra et al. (2010) link gambling behaviour and an individual’s propensity to take
risks. If that is the case, the traits influencing gambling behaviour can be translated
into the individual determinants of the willingness to take risks. One could extend
the results of this paper to the examination of risk attitudes of individuals in the
context of expected utility theory. In this case, the determinants of gambling atti-
tudes are of interest for both behavioural and financial economics.
To analyse gambling behaviour in Germany, we use the official income and consump-
tion sample (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe). This official statistic about
the living conditions of private households in Germany is the largest of its kind in
the European Union. Among other things, it provides information about individ-
ual socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics, household expenditure on
consumer goods, income, as well as on the expenditure on gambling products. Since
a high fraction of households do not consume gambling at all, the data on gambling
expenditure is censored at zero. Thus, we have to apply suitable models that are
robust to censored data. To identify the factors influencing gambling demand we
employ the Tobit (Tobin 1958) and the Truncated Normal Hurdle model (proposed
by Cragg 1971).
The findings are in line with most of the previous literature on gambling demand
(see Section 3). They show that female household heads spend less on gambling
than their male counterparts. The number of dependants in the household influ-
ences gambling behaviour negatively, while married couples have higher expenditures
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than single person households. We find that while gambling expenditures increase
with the age of the household head, they do so at a diminishing rate. Income is also
a strong determinant of gambling expenditure. Gambling expenditures rise with
the household’s income. We find no evidence that expenditures increase regres-
sively. Furthermore, the education and occupation of the household head influences
gambling behaviour. A higher education has a negative effect on the propensity to
gamble. We find that households with privately employed household heads tend to
spend more on gambling than those with unemployed or self-employed household
heads. On the other hand, a household head who is a civil servant or retired has
a positive effect.1 In contrast to previous literature, we find a negative effect of
urbanity on household gambling expenditure.
The paper is structured as follows: First, Section 2 outlines the economic relevance
of the gambling market in Germany and its structure. Section 3 provides an overview
of the previous literature focussing on gambling demand. In the following section,
a general identification strategy for censored data is presented. Since the data on
gambling expenditure is constituted of a high fraction of zero observations, models
that are robust to censored data need to be employed. Therefore, the Tobit and
the Truncated Normal Hurdle model are introduced. Section 5 analyses the socio-
demographic and socio-economic determinants of gambling expenditure. First, the
model specification is discussed. Then, the regression results and several robustness
measures are presented. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary of
the findings and discusses potential shortcomings and suggestions for future research.
2 Relevance and Structure of the Gambling Mar-
ket in Germany
The importance of the German gambling market is often underestimated in its eco-
nomic relevance. With total revenues of around e45 billion (DHS 2018) in 2016 it
was about the size of total revenues of the pharmaceutical industry (IQVIA 2018)
and more than one quarter of the size of total grocery revenues in Germany (Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2018). The gross gaming revenues (GGR)2 added up to around
e14.2 billion and the gambling market generated tax revenues of e5.3 billion in
2015 (Handelsblatt 2017). These numbers illustrate the economic significance of the
1The official income and consumption sample is subject to middle-class-bias (Rebeggiani 2007).
Retirees and civil servants are overrepresented in the sample, while unemployed and self-employed
individuals are under-represented. Therefore, the surprising results regarding the effects of the
occupational status of the household head on gambling expenditures might partially be caused by
a middle-class-bias. This topic is further discussed in Section 7.
2Gross Gaming Revenue is the amount wagered minus the winnings returned to players. It is
the most common measure to evaluate the gambling sector’s revenues.
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German gambling sector.3
The German gambling market is divided into a regulated and an unregulated sector.
The regulated market consists of state-run and social lotteries, commercial gambling
machines (Geldspielgera¨te),4 casinos and horse racing (by commercial bookmakers).
It holds the lion share of the overall market with gross gaming revenues of e10.4
billion in 2015, which accounted for 82% of market-wide GGR (Handelsblatt 2017).
By far the most popular gambling product in the regulated market are the commer-
cial gambling machines. They account for a market share of roughly more than 50%
of the regulated segment (Rebeggiani 2010). The unregulated market for gambling
products includes online providers (online-casinos, online-poker and online-lotteries)
as well as sports betting. Nowadays, the major share of sports bets are placed online
and the online sector gradually replaces commercial bookmakers (Rebeggiani 2012).
This market consists of gambling providers who do not possess a gambling conces-
sion in Germany but hold a license in any other European country, making them
illegal but tolerated in Germany (Rebeggiani and Breuer 2017). Since this market
is unregulated, revenues can only be estimated. In 2015, GGR were estimated to
gross e2.3 billion which accounted for 18% of total GGR in Germany (Handelsblatt
2017). Additionally, there exists a black market with estimated GGR of e1.5 billion
(Handelsblatt 2017). Including the black market the total GGR in Germany in 2015
totalled e14.2 billion (Handelsblatt 2017). The GGR usually accounts for around
one quarter of total revenues (Rebeggiani 2010).
Gambling is popular among the German population. In 2015 the Federal Center for
Health Education (BZgA) conducted a representative survey of 11,438 individuals.
The survey asked participants about their past gambling behaviour. It finds that
the lifetime prevalence of taking part in any kind of commerical gambling was 77.6%
for 16 to 70 year olds. Additionally, 37.3% reported that they had gambled during
the past 12 months (Haß and Lang 2016). Thus, the gambling market is not only
of economic significance but has to be considered from a social and political point
of view.
To this note, policy makers are often irresolute between whether or not a high
prevalence of gambling participation is a (socially) desirable outcome: It is a mixed
blessing. On the one hand, gambling products are highly taxed. Since 2010 the tax
revenue generated through the gambling sector continuously increased from e4.7 bil-
lion to e5.3 billion in 2015 (Handelsblatt 2017).5 The money generated from these
taxes is used to finance many charitable causes. Therefore, taxed gambling should
benefit households with lower social standing in particular, as well as the common
3The data in this section refers to the (latest) available data. For that reason the figures stated
are from 2015 as well as from 2016.
4There is a regulatory distinction between slot machines located in bars or commercial gambling
halls (Spielhallen) and the ones located in official casinos, which allow greater stakes and therefore
greater losses. The first category is labelled here ”commercial gambling machines”.
5These figures do not include trade taxes and corporation taxes.
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good in general. On the other hand, negative externalities arise from gambling,
especially when considering pathological gambling.6 The negative social effects that
arise from gambling are referred to as social costs. They can be both of direct
and indirect nature. The direct effects include expenditures on measures to pre-
vent addiction, mental health care, costs for divorces and acquisitive crimes among
others. The indirect costs are made up of costs that arise from the loss of jobs,
absenteeism due to illness or a decrease in productivity.7 Although these negative
externalities are impossible to be perfectly quantified, Becker estimated the direct
and indirect social costs of gambling in Germany totalled up to e326 million in 2008
(Becker 2011, p.39). Therefore, there has been a long standing debate concerning
the positive and negative externalities that arise from legal gambling. This debate
likewise focuses on the socio-economic characteristics of gamblers. Many researchers
hypothesize that the taxation of gambling products might actually be a form of re-
gressive taxation (e.g. Beckert and Lutter 2008; Borg et al. 1988; Clotfelter and
Cook 1987; Smith 2000). These studies find that low-income households spend
proportionally more of their income on (taxed) gambling products than better-off
households and therefore contribute relatively more to the tax revenue in relation to
their income. Nonetheless, low-income households should benefit to a greater extent
from the distribution of the tax towards public welfare. Thus, whether or not gam-
bling incorporates a form of regressive taxation is mainly dependent on the way the
government redistributes tax revenues generated through gambling. However, it is
necessary to determine the relationship of income, socio-demographic characteristics
and gambling expenditures in Germany to evaluate this potential trade-off.
3 Literature Review on the Determinants of Gam-
bling Demand
In general, the previous literature on gambling demand agrees that socio-demographic
as well as socio-economic characteristics influence both individual and household
gambling behaviour. There are various studies that empirically examine the de-
terminants of gambling consumption and expenditure (see Gandullia and Leporatti
2017 for a review).
The literature that studies the effects of socio-demographic variables on gambling
behaviour typically focuses on the traits gender, age and ethnicity (e.g. Afifi et al.
2010; Casey et al. 2011; Castre´n et al. 2018; Scott and Garen 1994; Worthington
et al. 2003). Most studies agree that men are more likely to gamble and to spend
6Here, pathological gambling is defined as an addiction where individuals are unable to resist
their urge to gamble despite harmful negative consequences or a desire to stop.
7For a comprehensive overview of the social costs of gambling see Collins et al. (2003) or Walker
et al. (1999).
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more money on gambling products than women (e.g. Gupta and Derevensky 1998;
Kitchen and Powells 1991; Sawkins and Dickie 2002). This is in line with the more
general result that men are more prone to risk and are more likely to engage in
risky activities in all life domains (Dohmen et al. 2011; Harris et al. 2006). With
respect to the influence of age the previous research is not that undivided. Although
some studies find that the participation in gambling activities is particularly high for
younger individuals (Albers and Hu¨bl 1997; Gupta and Derevensky 1998), several
other studies uncover that gambling expenditures increase with age (Worthington
et al. 2003; Sawkins and Dickie 2002). Thus, there seems to exist a parabolic rela-
tionship between age and gambling behaviour (Castre´n et al. 2018). Especially for
individuals who reached the retirement age, there seems to be a noticeable increase.
This effect might be due to increased free time as well as to preference changes and
boredom initiated by retirement. McNeilly and Burke (2000) conducted a survey to
investigate the motives for the retired population to gamble. The answers by the
respondents most agreed upon when asked for their motives to gamble were ”to have
fun” and ”to get away for the day”. Concerning ethnicity, different studies show
that minority racial groups are more likely to buy lottery tickets (e.g. Hansen 1995;
Mikesell 1989; Scott and Garen 1994; Tan et al. 2010). However, no study clearly
states that certain ethnic groups are more prone to gambling in general. The role of
ethnicity seems to be dependent on the individual local environment, neighbourhood
effects and cultural differences across countries (e.g. Casey et al. 2011; Kumar et
al. 2011; Lin et al. 1998; Slutske et al. 2015; Worthington et al. 2003). Urban
households have a higher tendency to gamble (Tan et al. 2010). This is presum-
ably due to easier access to gambling venues due to the distance and accessibility
to the closest venue is an important determinant of gambling prevalence (Storer et
al. 2009; Young et al. 2012). Additionally, the composition of a household has an
effect on gambling behaviour (Worthington et al. 2007). Married individuals tend
to spend less on gambling than singles (Castre´n et al. 2018) while married couples
with children gamble more than lone parents (MacDonald et al. 2004). Worthington
et al. (2003) find a negative effect of household size on lottery play suggesting that
gambling expenditure decreases with the number of dependants within the house-
hold.
Other than socio-demographic variables, socio-economic determinants of gambling
behaviour are of interest when analysing gambling behaviour. For instance, the level
of education is negatively correlated with gambling participation and expenditure
(Albers and Hu¨bl 1997; Borg and Mason 1988; Hansen 1995; Kitchen and Powells
1991; Sawkins and Dickie 2002). Furthermore, the occupational status has an ef-
fect on gambling behaviour. Worthington et al. (2007) detect that the source of
income rather than the income level determines gambling behaviour. For example,
non-white collar households (Tan et al. 2010) and civil servants (Albers and Hu¨bl
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1997) are more likely to gamble than other occupational groups. This is in line
with Layton’s and Worthington’s (1999) finding that managers and professionals
spend relatively less on gambling. They also find that participants of pensions and
veterans affairs payments have a greater probability to gamble and that receiving
unemployment benefits has a positive impact on the probability to play lottery or
poker machine gambling. Other studies confirm this result and find that partici-
pants in government income assistance programs are more likely to spend money
on the lottery (Laitner 1999; Clotfelter and Cook 1989). Despite the mentioned
relevance of other socio-economic characteristics, the literature commonly focuses
on income as a measure of economic conditions (e.g. Castre´n et al. 2018; Kitchen
and Powells 1991; Layton and Worthington 1999; Tan et al. 2010). Gambling is
considered to be a normal good with consumption increasing with income (Albers
and Hu¨bl 1997). Though, the previous literature finds an income elasticity of less
than one (Clotfelter and Cook 1987 and 1989) which suggests a regressive nature
of gambling. Low-income households spend proportionally more of their income
on gambling products (Beckert and Lutter 2008; Castre´n et al. 2018; Grote and
Matheson 2011; Kitchen and Powells 1991; Rintoul et al. 2013). This general result
supports the hypothesis that gambling might in fact be a form of regressive tax-
ation. Generally, the impact of socio-economic influence is particularly important
for policy makers. The evaluation of gambling regulations, legislation and addiction
prevention is dependent on the knowledge about the socio-economic composition
of the gambling population. Especially, the issue of a possible regressive nature of
a gambling tax can only be objectively assessed if detailed information about the
income of gamblers is available.
4 Data and Comparative Statistics
This section presents the data used in the analysis and presents some first impres-
sions on the relationship between gambling expenditure and other outcomes. Section
4.1 discusses the data and its preparation. Section 4.2 hints at some first impressions
on the drivers of gambling expenditures and their relationship to socio-demographic
and economic characteristics.
4.1 Data
The income and consumption sample EVS (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe)
is an official statistic about the living conditions of private households in Germany.
Among other things, it provides statistical information on the equipment with con-
sumer goods, the income, asset and debt situation and consumption spending of
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private households. The EVS is carried out in close coordination and cooperation
between the Federal Statistical Office and the Federal States Statistical Offices. The
data of the EVS is not publicly available, but anonymised scientific use files can be
obtained upon request. The cross section sample includes households of all social
groups, so that the EVS paints a representative picture of the German population.8
The EVS is conducted every five years. All households participate on a voluntary
basis. However, participating households receive a monetary award.9 Typically,
around 60,000 private households in Germany are surveyed within the framework of
the EVS, including around 14,000 households in the new federal states and Berlin.
The survey is the largest survey of its kind in the European Union. The EVS has
been held in the former federal territory since 1962/63, as well as in the new federal
states and Berlin since 1993. For our analysis we employ the latest available wave
of the EVS which was conducted in 2013. The EVS 2013 contains data on 42,792
households.
The survey contains questions about demographic and socio-economic variables on
the household level. The questions include information about the region and state
the household resides in. Furthermore, participating households register all their
income and expenditures within a three-month survey period.10 The expenditure
data includes the household spending on gambling products. Unfortunately, the
spendings are not further diversified into different types of gambling products.11
The reliability of self-reported data in gambling expenditures has to be addressed.
Ladouceur and Walker (1996) find evidence that gamblers are subject to cognitive
bias. Auer and Griffiths (2017) find that players with high losses are more likely to
understate their losses. Additionally, the wording in the question about gambling
expenditure in the EVS survey is vague.12 The survey did merely ask the respondent
8The cross section data are usually extrapolated using weights obtained from the German
microcensus to calculate aggregate figures. However, this was not done in this paper, since we are
only interested in the individual determinants of gambling expenditures and not in a calculation
of total gambling expenditures in Germany.
9The EVS sample is subject to sample bias. The monetary reward is credited against social and
unemployment benefits. Thus, the incentive for those households to participate is diminished and
unemployed individuals are underrepresented in the sample. Furthermore, compared to the Ger-
man population self-employed individuals are underrepresented in the sample, while civil servants
and retirees are overrepreseneted (Rebeggiani 2007).
10The participants of the EVS are divided into four groups with each group reporting in one
quarter of the year under review. This ensures that possible cyclical economic variation is accounted
for.
11This has relevance because it is expected that consumers of certain gambling products differ
in their characteristics, e.g. if one compares lottery ticket buyers to slot machine gamblers. Nev-
ertheless, previous studies generalize the results of the purchase of specific gambling products to
gambling in general (e.g. Albers and Hu¨bl 1997; Layton and Worthington 1999; Worthington et
al. 2003). The topic will be further discussed in Section 7.
12The EVS questionnaire from 2013 included one column, where subjects should report their
monthly gambling expenditures for each of the three months in the reporting period. The column
was placed in the section on expenditure for recreation, entertainment and culture. The notes
regarding what is meant by gambling expenditure included lotteries, bookmakers, casinos, slot
machines, online sports betting and funfair tickets.
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about monthly expenditure on gambling without further defining how to assess gam-
bling expenditure. This leaves room for interpretation. Respondents could interpret
gambling expenditures as actual expenditure or the difference between winnings and
losses. There is also no information to what extent the respondents excluded or in-
cluded reinvested winnings in their report. We proceed with the assumption that
respondents reported their expenditures without incorporating wins or excluding
reinvested winnings.
Additional to household data, the EVS also includes a wide range of variables for
each household member individually. That is very rare among surveys on income
and expenditure in such a great sample. Among those are information about birth
year, sex, marital, occupational and social status, education, insurance, citizenship,
taxation and income.13
The EVS proved to be an extraordinarily rich data set. Thanks to the extraor-
dinarily careful editing procedure of the German Federal Statistical Office, there
are, for example, no missing values. Nevertheless, some preparation of the data is
needed for further analysis. First, all information on income and expenditures are
given quarterly. Thus, these variables have to be averaged by month to make the
analysis more generally comprehensible. Though, this leads to some inaccuracies
due to the averaging process, it also yields an advantage to other data. Most other
studies just include one data point, which is generated at the time of the sampling.
Using only one point in time can be misleading though. For example, there might
be the chance that this was a particularly bad month in terms of income or that
this month due to an event gambling spending was extremely high. In the EVS we
have information for an average month over a three-month period. Therefore, the
data is more reliable because extraordinary events are averaged out.
Second, information on the age of participants is just given in terms of birth year.
Thus, a new variable has to be created which captures the actual age of participants.
Regrettably, this can create a small sample error because we do not know whether
or not the participant’s birthday has already taken place within the reporting year.
Thus, the new variable containing age could understate a participant’s age by one
year.
Furthermore, a closer look at the data revealed that twelve households report a neg-
ative gross income. We dropped these twelve observations because the source of the
negative income can not be identified. Additionally, the data on gambling expendi-
ture showed suspicious numbers for the highest five observations. That is, the five
observations with the highest gambling expenditure all equalled exactly e7,705 per
household for the three-months survey period or an average of e2,568.33 per month.
These figures were imputed by the Federal Statistical Office for reasons of confiden-
tiality. Because of this, we dropped these five outliers. This leaves the dataset with
13Throughout this paper the main income earner is referred to as the household head. The
participating households reported which household member is the main income earner.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of average monthly household gambling expenditures
Mean Sd Min Max Variance Skewness Kurtosis Obs.
(1) 11.97 40.61 0 2,568.33 1,649.91 33.87 1,952.25 42,780
(2) 11.67 29.77 0 1,682.67 886.11 12.05 411.65 42,775
Row (1) represents the original statistics on av. monthly hh gambling expenditure. Row (2)
represents the modified statistics after deleting the five highest observations.
Table 2: Distribution of average monthly household gambling expenditures
Percentiles 1% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%
(1) 0 0 12 36.33 58 121.67
(2) 0 0 12 36.33 57.67 121.33
Row (1) represents the original distribution of av. monthly hh gambling expen-
diture. Row (2) represents the modified distribution after deleting the five
highest observations.
a total of 42,775 observations. The new figures for monthly average gambling ex-
penditures are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. Deleting these five observations neither
changes the mean nor the distribution within the first 99 percentiles considerably
but reduces the variance, skewness and kurtosis substantially. Therefore, deleting
the observations eases any following estimation procedure without deteriorating the
results.
Even after excluding the five highest observations the variance and kurtosis of the
observed gambling expenditures remain high. The 420 highest observations range
from e121.33 to e1,682.67. The highest observation equals a deviation from the
mean of around 56 times its standard deviation. In practice a deviation from the
mean of around four times its standard deviation is considered plausible. A closer
look at the observations within the highest percentile reveals wide heterogeneity be-
tween observations. Especially, with respect to income and age, there seems to be no
trend as to whether or how they influence gambling expenditure. It rather conveys
the impression that the level of gambling expenditure within these observations is
arbitrary. Given the high amounts of monthly gambling expenditures, it is plausi-
ble to assume that these data points stem from individuals who are either problem
gamblers or have so much excess funds that they do not care about the amount they
gamble with. Hence, these amount decisions were likely to be chosen irrationally
and at random. Therefore, one should examine the extraordinary high observations
in the highest percentile of observations separately and consider to exclude them
from the regressions. This topic will be further discussed in Section 6.
Table 7 in the appendix displays the most important summary statistics for all vari-
ables used in the analysis of household gambling expenditure.
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4.2 Comparative Statistics and First Impressions
This section further explores the data and yields some first impressions on the re-
lationship of gambling expenditure and selected demographic and socio-economic
characteristics. Figure 1 depicts the relationships between certain household figures
and gambling expenditure as well as gambling expenditure relative to income (repre-
sented by the blue and red lines, respectively). The graphs present the relationship
of absolute and relative gambling expenditures to the variables age, household net
income, total household expenditures and expenditures on alcohol and tobacco, for
educational purposes and health. We did not use scatter plots to picture the rela-
tionship of the variables.14 Instead, we use locally weighted scatterplot smoothing
(LOWESS) with bandwidth 0.8. Lowess carries out a locally weighted least squares
regression of absolute and relative gambling expenditure on the mentioned variables.
Further, we restricted the independent variables to the first 99th percentiles. This is
due to the scarceness of data points for each value higher than the 99th percentile.
Especially, for data on expenditures outliers in the highest percentile distorted the
graphs to a great extent.
The first graph depicts the relationship of average total and relative expenditures of
gambling and the age of the household head. Both figures continually increase up
to an age of around 75 years. This suggests that gambling expenditures do rise with
age and continue to increase with the average retirement age. At the turning point
of an age of 75 this effect is reversed. The sudden decline could be explained by
decreased mobility and higher ill-falling preventing any gambling participation. The
graph depicting the relationship of gambling and income is particularly interesting.
First, note that total expenditure does increase with income but at a diminishing
rate. This supports previous findings that gambling is in fact a normal good with
consumption rising with income. On the other hand, gambling expenditures rela-
tive to income are highest at low household income and tend to decline with income.
This finding combined with diminishing total expenditures with income, facilitates
the proposition that gambling is regressive. As total household expenditures are
positively correlated with income, it is of no surprise that absolute gambling ex-
penditures rise with them. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that relative gambling
expenditures first rise with household expenditures for low income households but
then suddenly decline. It shows that low income households spend a larger frac-
tion of overall expenditures on gambling than middle and high income households.
Again, this supports the findings that gambling is regressive. With respect to ex-
penditures on alcohol and tobacco, educational purposes and health products, the
findings suggest both positive and negative relationships. In all cases absolute and
relative gambling expenditures display the same trend. While the relationship of
14The sheer volume of the data combined with the concentration of gambling expenditure in the
interval from e0 to e12 and large outlying observations, prevented the scatter plots to contribute
any informational value.
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Figure 1: Comparative statistics of absolute and relative average monthly gambling
expenditure and age, income and expenditure data
gambling and alcohol and tobacco consumption hints to a strong positive correla-
tion, the reverse is true for the relationship of gambling to education. The absolute
expenditure for health products is increasing with the average monthly gambling
expenditure. However, the gambling expenditure relative to income decreases when
the expenditure for health related products increases.
fFigure 2 displays bar graphs on the average gambling expenditures by gender, ed-
ucational, marital and occupational status of the household head. The first graph
shows that male household heads spend on average about e5 more than their female
counterparts. Possibly, this could be attributed to two factors. First, as established
in Section 3, men tend to gamble more and are more prone to risk in general. Sec-
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Figure 2: Average monthly gambling expenditure by gender, educational, marital
and occupational status of the household head (in e)
∗ Certificate of secondary education
∗∗ General certificate of secondary education
∗∗∗ Advanced technical college entrance qualification
ond, female household heads are more likely to be lone parents. As a lone parent
an individual might be less likely to gamble because they have a greater sense of
responsibility for the time and funds of the household and can presumed to have less
excess money to spend on recreational activities. The bottom left bar graph depicts
average household gambling expenditures by the marital status of the household
head. On average, singles and divorcees spend the least on gambling. This is a
rather unexpected result. One might assume that singles have more spare time to
gamble as well as face less responsibility in how to allocate their time and money.
On the other hand, it is plausible to assume that married households spend more on
gambling simply because on average they have a higher combined income. Besides,
one has to take into account that the data provides no information on the gambling
products purchased. It seems likely for married couples to engage in gambling types
such as the lottery and then spend more on each play combined than a single house-
hold would, solely due to their higher income. You can support this hypothesis by
the number for widowed household heads. They spend on average around e5 and e4
more than single and divorced household heads, respectively. A widowed household
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head is typically older than the average single or divorcee. Hence, it is probable that
his/her income is higher and that the higher spending can be accounted for by that
assuming he/she is not retired. With respect to the educational status the figures
are not surprising. The average monthly expenditure on gambling decreases with
the degree of education as found by Sawkins and Dickie (2002), Borg et al. (1991)
and Hansen (1995) among others.15 An exception to this pattern are individuals
who did not graduate from any secondary education. However, these subjects only
make up 0.4 % of the whole sample. Concerning occupational groups, civil servants
spend on average more than any other identified occupational group on gambling.
Our only notion on how to explain this, is that it could be the case that on average
civil servants have a higher salary than the other depicted groups. This can be
explained by the positive correlation of gambling expenditure and income. Further-
more, we find it surprising that self-employed individuals spend on average less than
employed individuals. We suspected that self-employed individuals spend more on
gambling because they have a higher willingness to take risks in general (Dohmen
et al. 2011). It will be interesting to separate the effect of self-employment from a
possible influence of income on gambling expenditure in the further regression anal-
ysis. Unemployed household heads spend on average the least on gambling products
which is presumably due to a lack of excess funds for recreational activities.
Overall, the comparative statistics tend to support previous findings on gambling
demand as were mentioned in Section 3. However, it will be interesting to exam-
ine the relationships of gambling expenditures and marital and occupational status
closer and separate their effect from the influence of income.
5 Identification Strategy for Censored Data
This section provides the general estimation framework used for both the identi-
fication of effects determining gambling behaviour on the household as well as on
the individual level. From Figure 3, it is obvious, that there is a high fraction of
responding households for whom the observed outcome is zero (58.4 %). The de-
pendent variable is constrained at zero and the observations cluster at this point.
This type of distribution is referred to as being censored (e.g. Greene 2003, p. 869).
The distribution of gambling expenditure is censored to the left from below. While
the data is censored at zero, the zeros in the sample represent a choice made by
the agent. They neither represent missing values or non-response outcomes nor a
decision out of control of the agent. Therefore, the zeros in the sample are the result
of an optimal choice of the household (Humphreys 2013). That is, a zero outcome
is the solution to a constrained utility maximization problem. It represents a corner
15The high school diploma obtained in the German Democratic Republic is comparable to an
advanced technical college entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife).
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Figure 3: Frequencies of gambling expenditures by intervals
solution and we speak of corner solution outcomes (Wooldridge 2002, p. 517-520).
Censored distributions are defined using latent variables. Suppose that the variable
on gambling expenditure y is censored at zero, then
y =
y∗ if y∗ > 00 if y∗ ≤ 0 ,
where y∗ is a latent variable observed for values greater than zero and censored
otherwise. In this setting an Ordinary Least Squares estimation (OLS) produces
inconsistent estimates both on the complete sample as well as on the subsample for
y > 0 (Wooldridge 2002, p. 524, 525). Instead, to account for the inconsistency we
use the standard censored Tobit model or Type I Tobit model (after Tobin 1958).
Tobit Model .
Whenever the data presents a corner solution outcome for the dependent variables,
a Type I Tobit Model is the most common approach to remedy the deficiencies of
OLS. The model is described by the equations
y∗i = xiβ + ui, ui ∼ N(0, σ2)
yi = max{0, y∗i },
with i randomly drawn from the population. The corresponding log-likelihood func-
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tion is given by
























where di is an indicator function (di = 1 if y
∗ > 0 and 0 otherwise), Φ is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function and φ is the standard normal
probability density function. The two parts of the log-likelihood function correspond
to the classical regression of uncensored variables and the relative probability of an
observation being censored, respectively. Thus, β estimates the (linear) effect of
Xi on the latent variable y
∗
i , not on the observed outcome yi. The Tobit model
makes the same assumptions about the distribution of the error term as OLS: ui ∼
N(0, σ2). Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981 and 1982) show among others that the
Tobit estimator is inconsistent when the assumption of normally distributed errors
is violated. Then the respective marginal effects when censoring at zero and given
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Equation (1) yields the marginal effect of x on the latent variable y∗ which is given
by coefficients βk estimated in the Tobit regression. However, in a Tobit regression
βk is of no informative value. We are mostly interested in the effect of the indepen-
dent variables on the actual outcome y, rather than the constructed latent variable
y∗. This effect is given by equation (2). It is the effect on the latent variable βk times
the probability of an observation being uncensored given by equation (4). As you
can see from equations (2) and (4), if the probability of an observation being greater
than zero Φ(xβ/σ) is equal to one, the marginal effect of x on the observed outcome
y reduces to βk and the Tobit equation is equivalent to that from an OLS. Equation
(3) corresponds to the marginal effect on the observed outcome conditional on being
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uncensored, where λ(c) is called the inverse Mills ratio formulated by Mills (1926).
Equation (5) follows from (4) and gives the marginal effect on the probability that
an observation is uncensored.
A drawback of the Type I Tobit Model is that it supposes that a single mechanism
governs both the participation decision (y = 0 or y > 0) as well as the amount
decision given y > 0. In the case of gambling expenditure, this means that the ques-
tions ”Does someone choose to gamble?” and ”How much would someone spend if
she/he gambles?” are determined by the same underlying process. In a standard
Tobit model the direction signs of partial effects will be the same for both the prob-
ability that y > 0 and the expectation of y because they are different multipliers of
β. Consequently, it is impossible for independent variables to have a negative effect
on the participation decisions and a positive effect on the amount decision or vice
versa. A remedy to this drawback are so called Hurdle models. Hurdle models are
an alternative which allow both decisions to be determined by separate processes,
where the hurdle is whether or not to choose y > 0.
Cragg’s Alternative to the Tobit Model
Cragg (1971) proposed a Hurdle model which nests the usual Type I Tobit model.
The first step is a probit model to determine the probability of y > 0, where the
conditional independence assumption is assumed to hold. Second, (y|x, y < 0)
follows a truncated normal distribution. Therefore, this model is also often referred
to as the Truncated Normal Hurdle (TNH) model. The density of (y|x, y < 0) is
equal to
f(y|x, y < 0) = φ[(y − xβ)/σ]/σ
Φ(xβ/σ)
,
where the term [Φ(xβ/σ)]−1 ensures that the density integrates to unity over y > 0.
Then, the density of y conditional on x becomes







This nests the Tobit density of y for γ = β/σ. Thus, one can test the null hypothesis
that the single underlying process determining the Tobit model is supported by the
data. The log-likelihood function is given by:
ln L(γ, β, σ) =
N∑
i=1





















From the log-likelihood function γ can be estimated by a probit model and β, σ by
a truncated normal regression model.
6 Determinants of Household Gambling Expen-
diture
6.1 Model Specification and Sample Restrictions
In the following the included regressors and the functional form of the conducted
regressions are presented. Furthermore, we discuss a sample restriction excluding
the highest one percent of observations on gambling expenditure. In each of the fol-
lowing regressions monthly gambling expenditure serves as the dependent variable.
On the right hand side we use variables that were established to have an impact on
gambling behaviour in Section 3. The socio-demographic factors include the gender
of the household head, a dummy variable for whether or not the household head
is married16, as well as the number of underaged children within the household.
These variables should represent conclusive information on the household composi-
tion. Additionally, the age of the household head is included. Furthermore, due to
the ambiguous findings on the impact of age on gambling expenditure, we include
age squared to allow for a non-linear relationship. The data does not provide infor-
mation on the ethnicity of the respondents. There is only data on whether a subject
holds the German citizenship. However, this information provides little insight since
98.3 % of the sample hold a German citizenship. Additionally, the dataset provides
no information about the religious beliefs of the individuals. One could derive some
individual’s religious affiliation from tax data but this is only possible for individ-
uals which are Roman-Catholic or Protestant. From the data we cannot conclude
whether the remaining subjects are irreligious or affiliated with any other religion.
Nevertheless, we include a dummy variable for Christianity as a control to avoid
omitted variable bias.17 Furthermore, we include a dummy variable for whether or
not the household resides in a municipality of a population of 100,000 or above.18
The socio-economic variables include information about the education, the house-
hold head’s occupational status and income of the households. Education is mea-
sured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the household head completed
the German university entrance diploma (Abitur) or the advanced technical col-
lege entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife).19 Occupational status is measured
16Civil unions are subsumed under the term marriage in this context.
17The problem with this approach is that unemployed individuals do not pay church taxes. Thus,
the approach probably understates the number of individuals with Christian beliefs.
18In the following we refer to a municipality of a population of 100,000 or above to as a city.
19We attribute the advanced technical college entrance qualification to an university entrance
qualification because both graduation certificates qualify for a university-type tertiary education.
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by dummy variables for unemployment, self-employment, retirement and whether
or not the household head is a civil servant (including professional military). The
dummy variable for unemployment includes housewives and househusbands. The
influence of income is measured by household’s net income in logs to account for
the high skewness of income within the sample population. From Figures 4 and 5 in
the appendix it becomes clear that the log transformation reduces the skewness of
income and the distribution approximates a normal distribution more closely. We
do not have to edit the data to avoid missing values that arise from ln(0) as we do
not observe any net income equal to zero.
To control for systematic differences between the quarter of the year the survey was
taken in, quarterly dummies are used. To account for geographic differences we in-
clude a dummy variable for whether or not the household resides in the new federal
territories (including Berlin).
As stated in Section 4, the gambling expenditures in the top one percent of the
distribution are considerably higher than within the first 99 percentiles. We suspect
that these values are not chosen rationally as the optimal household choice but are
chosen at random. One could assume that the high gambling expenditures are due
to a higher income of the respective households. It is true that the mean income
of these households is on average higher than the mean income of the full sample.
Nevertheless, when investigating a scatterplot of gambling expenditures and income,
there seems to be no clear positive relationship between the amount of gambling ex-
penditures and income. We conclude that income is not the only driver of those
extreme values. Rather, we suspect that the amounts of gambling expenditure are
mostly chosen arbitrarily and some of these households comprise problem or patho-
logical gamblers.
Dickerson (1993) declares that gambling addiction impairs the control over gam-
bling. He classifies impaired controls as behaviour where the gambler has lost or
spent more than intended or found it hard to give up or stop. If we assume that
the observations within the top percentile of gambling expenditures are subject to
impaired control, it is advisable to analyse them separately from the rest of the
sample. The amount spent on gambling by those households is therefore likely to
have been chosen arbitrarily. Including these observations would bias the results of
the following regressions.
Furthermore, Tourangeau’s (2000) results suggest that frequent gamblers report
their gambling behaviour less accurately. Given this finding, the reporting error is
likely to be higher in the top percentile of gambling expenditures than in the rest
of the sample.
Thus, we conduct regressions on both the full sample and the sample restricted to
the bottom 99 percentiles., to see whether and to what extent the regression results
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are affected.20 Table 8 in the appendix displays the means for the regressors in the
Tobit estimation for the full sample, the first 99 percentiles and the highest one
percent of the sample. As one can see, the characteristics of the average household
in the top percent differ from the average household within the full sample. The
average household head in the highest percentile is by far less likely to be female, is
on average 6 years older, is more likely to be married and less likely to have a higher
secondary education. Furthermore, the households average income is substantially
higher. The household head is more likely to be retired or a civil servant but less
likely to be either unemployed or self-employed. The variation in income and retire-
ment is likely to stem from the higher average age.
6.2 Regression Results and Robustness
The regression results of the Tobit regression on the full sample are given in column
(1) in Table 3. The results of the regression on the sample excluding the highest
percentile of gambling expenditures are presented with and without controls in col-
umn (2) and (3) of Table 3, respectively.21 As one can see from Table 3, the results
of the Tobit regression on the full and the restricted sample display the same signs
for all coefficients but greatly differ in magnitude. Most coefficients of regression (1)
are around one third bigger than those of the regression on the restricted sample
(2). The directions of the greater magnitude are in line with the deviations from
the means of the full sample from the highest percentile given in Table 8. Including
the top one percent greatly affects the coefficients of the regressions in the direction
of their means. As stated in the previous section, we assume that the highest obser-
vations on gambling expenditure are not generated by a optimal household choice
and in contrast the lower observations might be subject to impaired control and a
higher reporting error. For this reasons we proceed to evaluate the marginal effects
only for the regression on the restricted sample.
The results of the Tobit regression show statistically significant coefficients for all
variables but the marriage and retirement dummy variables. Note that the signs of
the coefficients are in line with the previous findings on gambling behaviour (see Sec-
tion 3). Being female, a higher education, the number of dependants (here: children)
in the households and the dummy variable for home-ownership: all have a negative
effect on gambling expenditure. The regression also confirms the previous findings
that gambling expenditure increases with income. Additionally, the coefficient for
being a civil servant is positive, as was suggested by Albers and Hu¨bl (1997). A
20Another possible approach to exclude problem gamblers from the data would be to exclude
any observations who spend a proportionally high amount of their income on gambling. However,
we did not proceed with this method because we could not find a reliable threshold.
21For reference the results of an OLS estimation on the full as well as the restricted sample are
given in Table 9 in the appendix.
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Table 3: Tobit Regression Results on the Full and the Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample
Hh head is female -6.966∗∗∗ -4.408∗∗∗ -4.431∗∗∗
(-9.84) (-9.32) (-9.33)
Age of hh head 2.289∗∗∗ 1.595∗∗∗ 1.593∗∗∗
(16.63) (17.39) (17.36)
Age of hh head squared -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗
(-12.58) (-13.37) (-13.34)
Hh head is married 0.773 1.783∗∗∗ 1.810∗∗∗
(0.99) (3.41) (3.44)
Children <18 years -6.439∗∗∗ -4.507∗∗∗ -4.507∗∗∗
(-13.96) (-14.69) (-14.68)
Hh lives in a city -1.839∗∗ -1.239∗∗ -1.219∗∗
(-2.70) (-2.73) (-2.68)
Log(net income) 18.14∗∗∗ 11.53∗∗∗ 11.41∗∗∗
(25.20) (23.96) (23.19)
Hh head completed university -8.444∗∗∗ -6.056∗∗∗ -6.063∗∗∗
entrance diploma (-13.17) (-14.15) (-14.14)
Hh head is unemployed -8.903∗∗∗ -7.079∗∗∗ -7.058∗∗∗
(-5.11) (-6.10) (-6.05)
Hh head is self-employed -5.620∗∗∗ -4.983∗∗∗ -4.926∗∗∗
(-3.43) (-4.55) (-4.46)
Hh head is a civil servant 3.380∗∗ 2.245∗∗ 2.275∗∗
(3.12) (3.09) (3.13)
Hh head is retired 2.152 1.754∗ 1.784∗
(1.88) (2.30) (2.31)
Hh owns house/apartment -5.846∗∗∗ -2.694∗∗∗ -2.647∗∗∗
(-7.91) (-5.45) (-5.34)
Controls No No Yes
Constant -221.8∗∗∗ -143.5∗∗∗ -142.7∗∗∗
(-34.54) (-33.49) (-32.86)
Sigma 52.24∗∗∗ 34.87∗∗∗ 34.87∗∗∗
(174.44) (167.92) (167.92)
Observations 42775 42351 42351
Log-likelihood -108,441.42 -100,340.43 -100,382.28
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table represents the regression results of a Tobit regression on the full sample without
controls (1), the restricted sample without controls (2) and the restricted sample with
controls (3). The controls include dummies for Christian belief, residing in the new
territory (incl. Berlin) and dummies for the quarter of 2013 the individual reported in.
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negative coefficient for self-employment is somewhat surprising. Although previous
literature does not hint at how self-employment influences gambling behaviour, one
would assume that being self-employed implies a higher willingness to take risks
and in turn a higher affinity towards gambling. Also unemployment seems to de-
crease gambling expenditures even when separated from a possible income effect.
Both coefficients for age and age squared, are statistically significant with different
signs. The coefficients suggest that gambling expenditure increases with age but at
a diminishing rate. A more thorough evaluation of the coefficients and the resulting
marginal effects are given in Section 6.4.
In the following, we present several robustness checks to evaluate the results of re-
gression (2) in Table 3. As a specification test for the model estimated in (2), we
performed a link test as suggested by Pregibon (1980) based on Tukey (1949).22 The
link test reveals no problems with the specification.
The results of the Tobit regression (2) are complemented by a Tobit regression in-
cluding the aforementioned controls (3) on the same restricted sample. Note that
the inclusion of controls does not change the coefficients to a great extent. A likeli-
hood ratio test rejects the hypothesis of a better model fit with controls at the 1 %
level and reveals that adding the controls does not result in a statistically significant
improvement in the model fit. Additionally, it is to mention that the coefficients
for all control variables revealed themselves to be not significant at the 1 % level.23
Therefore, we proceed with our analysis without adding controls (including squared
logarithmic income).
Next, we check the validity of the Tobit assumption that a single mechanism gov-
erns both the participation decision (y = 0 or y > 0) as well as the amount decision
given that y > 0. We do this by estimating a Truncated Normal Hurdle model as
introduced in Section 5. We employ the same independent variables as in the Tobit
estimation and conduct the regression on the sample restricted to the bottom 99
% of observations on gambling expenditures.24 Table 4 displays the coefficients of
22The idea of the link test is that if a regression is correctly specified, one should not be able to
find any additional independent variables that are significant (except by chance).
23Following Crowley et al. (2012) we took into consideration that income could be entering
the estimation equation polynomially. Previous research has shown that gambling expenditure is
regressive. While it increases with income, it is proposed to do so at a diminishing rate. The
comparative statistics of the relationship of gambling expenditure and income as shown in the
top right graph in Figure 1 also hint to the fact that a income might effect gambling behaviour
non-linearly. To take this possibly regressive effect on income into account, we conducted another
Tobit regression using the same dependent variables as in regression (2) of Table 3 but including
the squared logarithm of net household income. We again conducted a link-test with the new
model specification. The link-test rejected the hypothesis of a correctly specified model at the 0%
level.
24Unfortunately, when we first tried to estimate the equation, the maximum likelihood estima-
tor did not converge (after 100 iterations). A possible explanation for a lack of convergence is
using the same independent variables in both ”hurdles” of the estimation. We tried several logic
combinations to assign the variables to the hurdles but convergence could still not be achieved. A
lack of convergence can also be an indication for too many unexpected responses. In the regression
equation at hand the inability to converge is most likely due to extreme values in the observations
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the first and second tiers of the TNH regression. First, note that all statistically
significant coefficients display the same sign for both tier 1 and tier 2. Only the
signs of the coefficients for the dummy variables for self-employment differ. How-
ever, it is shown to be insignificant at the 5 % level. Second, one can observe that
all of the statistically significant coefficients have the same direction as in the Tobit
regression. Additionally, remember that for β/σ = γ the TNH model reduces to the
Tobit model. If we compare the figures for β/σ to γ, the numbers for both values
are similar in magnitude for most independent variables. Given this finding, it is
likely that the TNH density function reduces to the Tobit density function for the
given regression equation. We therefore do not reject the Tobit assumption that the
same underlying process generates both the participation and the amount decision.
Another problem could arise due to neglected simultaneity. As was established in
Section 3, income has a significant effect on gambling behaviour. Note however, that
it is plausible to suggest that the reverse is also true. First, consider the extreme case
of a pathological gambler. Although gambling expenditures will rise with income,
independent of the level of income the individual will gamble. On the other hand,
if the gambling expenditures are relatively high to income, income will significantly
decrease with gambling expenditure. On the contrary, gambling expenditure could
also yield a positive effect on income. Consider an individual beating the odds and
winning substantially. Then, his income is positively influenced by his gambling
expenditure. Whereas, it might be that gambling expenditure in turn increase after
a person wins. In these cases, simultaneity can be an issue. Therefore, we need to
check if this is the case in the EVS data. In order to do so, we employ a model
which fits a Tobit model where the covariate of income is endogenously determined.
The estimation results are given in Table 10. A Wald-test of exogeneity rejects the
null hypothesis of endogeneity at the 5% level. Therefore, we include log of income
in the specification.
6.3 Heteroskedasticity
The consistency of the Tobit model depends on the assumption that the latent
variable y∗ has a homoskedastic normal distribution. Heteroskedasticity and non-
normality result in the Tobit estimator βˆ being inconsistent for β (Wooldridge 2002,
p. 533). However, the magnitude of this bias is unknown. Consequently, we test for
and heterogeneity in the observations of the top 1 %. All the regressors used in the model are
either dummy variables or display a close representation of a normal distribution with small vari-
ances; age, age squared and log(net income). Thus, we concluded that the non-convergence must
be due to the distribution of household gambling expenditure. Suggested remedies to the problem
are either a transformation of the respective variable or rescaling it. To facilitate convergence we
tried a logarithmic transformation of household gambling expenditures as well as rescaling them
by 1/100 and 1/1000. None of these three approaches were fruitful. Thus, we cannot produce
regression results on the full sample.
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Table 4: Regression Results of the TNH regression
TNH
Tier 1 Tier 2
Hh head is female -0.101∗∗∗ -40.01∗∗∗
(-6.81) (-6.04)
Age of hh head 0.0435∗∗∗ 13.91∗∗∗
(15.42) (7.75)
Age of hh head squared -0.000330∗∗∗ -0.0980∗∗∗
(-12.04) (-6.85)
Hh head is married 0.0659∗∗∗ -6.012
(3.99) (-1.06)
Children <18 years -0.102∗∗∗ -41.12∗∗∗
(-10.76) (-7.27)
Hh lives in a city -0.0583∗∗∗ 8.356
(-4.08) (1.68)
Log(net income) 0.275∗∗∗ 93.05∗∗∗
(18.31) (9.40)
Hh head completed university -0.193∗∗∗ -18.496∗∗∗
entrance diploma (-14.27) ( 4.902)
Hh head is unemployed -0.239∗∗∗ -45.23∗
(-6.82) (-2.37)
Hh head is self-employed -0.190∗∗∗ 9.211
(-5.58) (0.74)
Hh head is a civil servant 0.0706∗∗ 9.931
(3.06) (1.29)
Hh head is retired 0.0232 15.04
(0.95) (1.94)








t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table displays the results of a Truncated Normal Hur-
dle (TNH) regression. The dependent variable is average
monthly household gambling expenditure. Tier 1 corre-
sponds to the first hurdle, where the participation decision
(y > 0) is determined via probit. Tier 2 corresponds to the
second hurdle, where the amount decision (how high is y
given y > 0) is determined via a truncated normal regres-
sion.
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non-normality and heteroskedasticity. We compute a Langrance Multiplier statistic
for testing the Tobit specification against the alternative of a model that is non-
linear in the regressors and contains an error term that can be both heteroskedastic
and non-normally distributed. The test rejects the null hypothesis. This suggests
that the error term in the estimation of the Tobit model in (2) is subject to het-
eroskedasticity and non-normality.25
To approach this problem, we estimate a Tobit model allowing for multiplicative het-
eroskedasticity as proposed by Petersen and Waldman (1981). Column (1) of Table
5 displays the results of a regression allowing for multiplicative heteroskedasticity in
the Tobit model. Here, the variance is assumed to be of the form σ2i = exp(xiα). A
test of the hypothesis that α equals zero can be based on the likelihood ratio statistic
(Greene 2003, p. 768). For the two regressions the corresponding likelihood ratio
statistic is −2(100, 272.41− 100, 340.43) = 136.0337. The statistic has a limiting χ2
distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The hypothesis that α = 0 is rejected. When
compared to the initial Tobit regression assuming homoskedasticity, the coefficients
for β of both regressions are very similar. Also the signs of the coefficients are
equal for all of the statistically significant coefficients. This hints to the conclusion
that the coefficients of the Tobit regression assuming homoskedastic and normally
distributed errors are close to the true values. Additionally, one has to be careful
when comparing the estimates of β of both models. Although, the β coefficients
may differ, the marginal effects ∂E(y|y > 0)/∂x and ∂E(y)/∂x can be very similar.
As a second measure to test the robustness of the results given the found het-
eroskedasticity and non-normality we employ the censored least absolute deviations
estimator (CLAD). The CLAD estimator was introduced by Powell (1984). Given
a data set censored at zero, the CLAD estimator is based on the minimization of
the sum of absolute residuals. Unlike the Tobit model, Powell’s CLAD estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal for a wide range of error distributions. The
estimator considers alternative conditional moments that are less altered by censor-
ing. It assumes an error term with a conditional median equal to zero. The CLAD
model is described by the equation
y∗ = xβ + u with Median(u|x) = 0,
which implies that Median(y∗|x) = xβ. Then β can be estimated without distri-
butional assumptions for the error term and without assuming that x and u are
independent.
The use of the CLAD model is problematic if the majority of observations is within
the censored range of the data. The CLAD model exclusively yields distinct regres-
25The heteroskedasticity as well as non-normality test statistics are by far smaller for the Tobit
regression on the sample restricted to the bottom 99 percentiles than the regression on the whole
sample.
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Table 5: Regression results of a Tobit estimation allowing for multiplicative het-




Hh head is female -4.546∗∗∗ -4.767∗∗∗
(-9.83) (-9.98)
Age of hh head 1.549∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(17.49) (9.41)
Age of hh head squared -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.00747∗∗∗
(-13.41) (-7.50)
Hh head is married 1.718∗∗∗ 0.253
(3.33) (0.51)
Number of children <18 years -4.709∗∗∗ -2.832∗∗∗
(-14.96) (-9.01)
Hh lives in a city -1.134∗ -1.888∗∗∗
(-2.54) (-4.38)
Log(net income) 9.797∗∗∗ 9.355∗∗∗
(19.45) (19.39)
Hh head completed university -5.955∗∗∗ -5.922∗∗∗
entrance diploma (-14.09) (-14.12)
Hh head is unemployed -6.581∗∗∗ -6.349∗∗
(-6.06) (-3.14)
Hh head is selfemployed -4.472∗∗∗ -5.406∗∗∗
(-4.06) (-4.78)
Hh head is a civil servant 2.189∗∗ 1.304
(2.93) (1.89)
Hh head is retired 1.612∗ 3.401∗∗∗
(2.17) (4.82)










t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table displays the results of a Tobit regression allowing for multiplicative
heteroskedasticity (1) and a Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD)
regression (2). The dependent variable is monthly average household gam-
bling expenditure. Regression (1) is conducted on the sample restricted to
the bottom 99 percentiles of the distribution for average monthly household
gambling expenditure. Regression (2) is conducted on a random subsam-
ple of 10,000 observations, where 2,394 observations where dropped by the
iterative linear programming algorithm.
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sion results if the median of the regression function is positive and not within the
censored part of the observations. This is not the case here (see Table 2). However,
Powell extended his model in a way such that any other quantile can be used to
conduct the estimation (1986). Horowitz (1988) showed that given a highly censored
sample the expanded model using quantiles above the median yields satisfying re-
sults. In the performed CLAD regression we chose the 70th percentile instead of the
median. We follow Rogers (1993) for the CLAD estimator and use bootstrap esti-
mates of the standard errors. Due to the bootstrapping technique and the volume of
observations the CLAD estimation is computationally highly intensive.26 In order
to produce results faster, we use a random subsample of 10,000 observations. This
subsample consist of around one quarter of all observations. We argue that, given
the volume of observations still in the subsample, an estimation on this subsample
is still viable to be compared to the Tobit results. The results of the the CLAD esti-
mation are given in column (2) of Table 5.27 As one can see in Table 5 the results of
the CLAD estimation are very similar to that of the Tobit under homoskedasticity
as well as the Tobit model allowing for heteroskedasticity.
Unfortunately, neither the results of the Tobit regression allowing for heteroskedas-
ticity nor the CLAD regression are informative. The CLAD estimation is uninfor-
mative about E(y|x), E(y|x, y > 0) and P (y > 0|x). Further, the statistical soft-
ware used to estimate the model (Stata) allowing for multiplicative heteroskedas-
ticity does not provide the necessary coefficients to compute the marginal effects
∂E(y|y > 0)/∂x and ∂E(y)/∂x, which would be of interest. Hence, we only use
the two models to check the robustness of the Tobit estimation and to confirm its
coefficients. In order to analyse the marginal effects of the regressors on gambling
expenditure we have to rely on the estimation results of the Tobit model.
We conclude from the similarity of the results of the Tobit estimation on the re-
stricted sample from Table 3 and the estimation results from regression (1) and (2)
in Table 5, that even under heterosedasticity the Tobit results are valid. In addition,
the OLS coefficients should approximate the marginal effect on the observed variable
y, ∂E(y)/∂x. In the next section it will be shown that this is the case here. Never-
theless, the magnitude of divergence to the true marginal effects remains unknown
and the results are a mere approximation of the true effects. The results should be
interpreted in this spirit.
26The estimation on the full sample as well as the restricted sample could not complete to
produce results after running the estimation for more than four hours (after 100 bootstraps and
allowing 16,000 iterations to find a solution).
27The estimation technique used is Buchinsky’s (1991) iterative linear programming algorithm
(ILPA). The ILPA first estimates a regression on the full sample and then deletes observations
for which the predicted value of the dependent variable is less than zero. Then another quantile
regression is estimated on the reduced sample, where negative predicted values are dropped again.
That is, observations are dropped if the predicted value of the dependent variable is less than the
censoring value. The estimator converges when there are no negative predicted values after two




The coefficients for β given by the Tobit regression cannot be interpreted straight-
forward as OLS coefficients. As shown by equation (1), β only displays the effect on
the latent variable rather than the observed outcome. Although we are estimating
the effect of the independent variables x on the latent variable y∗, y∗ does not have
a meaningful interpretation. Instead, we are interested in the effects of x on the
unconditional expected value of the dependent variable, the expected value of the
dependent variable conditional on being uncensored and the probability of being
uncensored. These are given by equations (2), (3) and (5) respectively. The results
are shown in Table 6.
The Tobit regression produces marginal effects conditional on the independent
variables. The marginal effects displayed in Table 6 are given for a discrete change
from 0 to 1 for the dummy variables. The marginal effects of the discrete indepen-
dent variables age of the household head, number of children within the household
and income are evaluated at their means. Therefore, the marginal effects have to
be displayed for a reference household. Here, the marginal effects given in Table
6 correspond to a a household whose head is an unmarried male who is about 53
years old. He does neither have children living within his household nor does he
live in an urban area or in his own property. He did not complete the university
entrance diploma (or the advanced technical college entrance qualification) and is
in employment. The average net household income corresponds to the mean of the
(logarithmic) net household income, which is around e2,900. Therefore, these exact
marginal effects are applicable to this individual and may differ for an individual
with other characteristics. Further on, we will present the deviations in the effects
for different ages of the household head and household income.
This said, an individual with the same characteristics as described, would spend
around e2 less on gambling and would be 5% less likely to gamble at all, if he
was female. If he was already gambling, being female would reduce his average
spendings by around e1.52. Having one child would decrease the average monthly
expenditure on gambling by e2 while the probability to gamble at all would decline
by 5% per child. This confirms the finding that a higher number of dependants in
the household decreases gambling expenditure. It might be that this decrease is due
to a reduced willingness to take risks in general and an increase in responsibility due
to the dependants.
Considering the socio-economic dummy variables on occupation and education, hav-
ing a higher secondary education (university entrance diploma or advanced technical
college entrance qualification) has the greatest effect on the average gambling ex-
penditure. The reference individual spends around e2.8 less on gambling than a
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Hh head is female -4.408∗∗∗ -2.048∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ -0.0502∗∗∗
Age of hh head 1.595∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗
Age of hh head squared -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.00548∗∗∗ -0.00407∗∗∗ -0.000134∗∗∗
Hh head is married 1.783∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗
Children <18 years -4.507∗∗∗ -2.094∗∗∗ -1.553∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗
Hh lives in a city -1.239∗∗ -0.576∗∗ -0.427∗∗ -0.0141∗∗
Log(net income) 11.53∗∗∗ 5.358∗∗∗ 3.973∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
Hh head completed univer-
sity entrance diploma
-6.056∗∗∗ -2.814∗∗∗ -2.086∗∗∗ -0.0690∗∗∗
Hh head is unemployed -7.079∗∗∗ -3.289∗∗∗ -2.439∗∗∗ -0.0807∗∗∗
Hh head is self-employed -4.983∗∗∗ -2.315∗∗∗ -1.717∗∗∗ -0.0568∗∗∗
Hh head is a civil servant 2.245∗∗ 1.043∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 0.0256∗∗
Hh head is retired 1.754∗ 0.815∗ 0.604∗ 0.0200∗
Hh owns house/apartment -2.694∗∗∗ -1.252∗∗∗ -0.928∗∗∗ -0.0307∗∗∗
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
42,351 observations
The table displays the marginal effects of a Tobit regression of the restricted sample of the bottom
99 percentiles of average monthly household gambling expenditures. The dependent variable is
average monthly household gambling expenditure. The marginal effects are given for a discrete
change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1 (incl. number of children). The discrete variables are
evaluated at their means 53.33 (age), 3,091.14 (age2) and 7.97 (log income).
less educated individual with the same characteristics. This is in line with every
previous finding on gambling behaviour. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that while
education has the greatest effect on actual spending, being unemployed decreases
the probability to gamble at all to the greatest extent, namely by 8 %. Even when
the income effect of unemployment is separated, unemployed individuals spend less
and are less likely to gamble. We find this result unexpected since previous studies
found that the recipients of government payments generally have a higher tendency
to gamble (Laitner 1999; Clotfelter and Cook 1989). Furthermore, the finding that
self-employment decreases gambling expenditures and the probability to gamble is
interesting. Although the effect of self-employment on gambling expenditures is not
very large, being self-employed reduces the probability of y > 0 by nearly as much
as having a child. As previously stated, we would have assumed that self-employed
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household heads inhabit riskier attitudes and are thus more likely to gamble.
Another remarkable result, although already confirmed by Albers et al (1997), is
that civil servants gamble more than the other occupational groups. The reference
individual spends on average e1 more on gambling products and is 2.5 % more likely
to gamble than if he was employed in the private sector. It would be interesting to
find out more about the cause for this finding. Also striking is the insignificance of
the retirement dummy. As suggested by Mcneilly and Burke (2000) retirees in the
USA devote more time and funds to gambling. The discrepancy could be explained
by cultural and behavioural differences of US and German retirees.
Surprisingly, living in an urban area reduces the gambling expenditure of the ref-
erence individual. As stated in Section 3, the previous findings suggest a higher
gambling participation in urban areas due to closer gambling venues. In the EVS
data, urbanity seems to have a reverse effect. This could be explained by fewer enter-
tainment venues in rural areas. It could be that individuals there turn to gambling
as a recreational activity28 while urban households use other forms of recreation only
available in bigger cities. Finally, a strong driver of gambling expenditure is income.
This suggests that income is a normal good with consumption increasing with in-
come. Concerning the aforementioned regressiveness of gambling expenditure, our
regression results do not support this claim. The results rather show that the effect
of income on gambling expenditure increases with higher incomes (see Table 12 in
the appendix).
As stated previously, the marginal effects given by the Tobit regression are condi-
tional on x. Tables 11, 12 and 13 in the appendix show the marginal effects of the
Tobit regression on the observed outcome y at different values of age, the house-
hold’s net income and by gender of the household head. The magnitude of the
marginal effects all increase with age. The same applies to an increase in household
net income. With respect to income, the marginal effects are all greater for male
household heads than they are for female.
Nevertheless, keep in mind that the Tobit regression is subject to heteroskedastic
and non-normally distributed errors. Although the robustness measures point to
the validity of the results, they should still be interpreted as a close approximation
of the true effects.
28This includes gambling which is commonly also available in rural areas such as online gambling
or commercial gambling machines.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
7.1 Discussion of the Results
Overall, our findings on the determinants of gambling expenditure confirm most
results of previous international literature on gambling demand presented in Sec-
tion 3. We find that a female household head spends on average less on gambling
than a male. The level of education also has a strong negative effect on gambling
expenditure. While the previous literature is divided about the effect of age on gam-
bling behaviour, we find that gambling expenditure increases with the age of the
household head but at a diminishing rate. The household composition influences
the amount spent on gambling. Married couples tend to spend more than single
households, while gambling expenditure decreases with the number of children in
the household. Contrary to the results of Tan et al. (2010) and Beckert and Lutter
(2008), we find that households in rural areas have higher gambling expenditures
than urban households.
One of the strongest drivers of gambling expenditure is income. This suggests that
gambling is a normal good with consumption increasing with income. Concerning
the aforementioned regressiveness of gambling expenditure, our regression results
cannot verify this claim. Our results rather show that the effect of income on gam-
bling expenditure continually increases with higher incomes (see Table 12 in the
appendix). On the other hand, the comparative statistics support the notion that,
while gambling expenditure increases with income, it does so recessively.
Moreover, the occupation of the household head also influences gambling behaviour.
Households with unemployed and self-employed household heads spend less than
those with privately employed and household heads who are civil servants. The
finding that a self-employment household head has a negative effect on gambling ex-
penditure is surprising. Dohmen et al (2011) find that someone who is self-employed
is more willing to take risks in general. Considering the correlation between risk and
gambling attitudes as suggested by Mishra et al. (2010), these results need further
investigation.
A possible explanation for the surprising results of the effects the occupational sta-
tus has on gambling expenditures is the sample composition of the EVS. The EVS
data suffers from a middle-class-bias (Rebeggiani 2007). Compared to the actual
German population the fraction of household heads who are retirees or civil servants
is overrepresented in the EVS, while self-employed and unemployed household heads
are greatly underrepresented. Additionally, the mean household income in the EVS
exceeds mean household incomes in other German data sets, such as the German
microcensus.29 This imbalance is partly due to the fact that the monetary reward
for taking part in the survey is credited against social and unemployment benefits.
29The microcensus is a representative household survey in Germany.
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Thus, the incentive for recipients of governmental transfers to participate in the
EVS is weakened. Another potential explanation for the bias is that taking part
in the EVS consumes a considerable amount of time. For example, retirees might
be more likely to take part in the survey because they have more free time than
individuals who are still in the workforce. Additionally, self-employed individuals
might not have the spare time to participate. Therefore, the especially surprising
results regarding the effects of the occupational status of the household head on
gambling expenditures might partially be caused by a middle-class-bias.
The previous literature on gambling demand mainly considers U.S. or Canadian
data. Although gambling attitudes in Northern America might be similar in West-
ern Europe, we cannot be sure whether there might be systematic differences due
to geographical and cultural disparities. Only a small strand of literature analysing
European data sets is available (e.g. Beckert and Lutter 2008; Castre´n et al. 2018;
Gandullia and Leporatti 2017; Volberg et al. 2004). However, there exist only two
empirical studies investigating determinants of gambling behaviour in Germany. The
more recent study by Beckert and Lutter (2008) examines the socio-demographic
and economic factors which influence lottery purchases using a representative sur-
vey. Their findings are similar to ours, stating that income and marriage both have
positive effects on gambling while being female and the level of education negatively
influence the purchase of lottery tickets. Different is that they find a positive re-
lationship between urbanity and lottery participation. However, their results are
obviously not directly comparable to ours. First, they only investigate the deter-
minants of lottery participation and lottery ticket purchases. The determinants of
purchasing lottery tickets as a specific form of gambling might differ from those
of other gambling products (or gambling expenditure in general, as in our case).
Second, they estimate the expenditure on lottery tickets via OLS. Since they face
censored data, their results are probably subject to bias. Nevertheless, although the
marginal effects might be biased, their findings essentially coincide with ours.
Another study by Albers and Hu¨bl (1997) estimates individual patterns of gambling
in Germany. In their study, the authors differentiate between the effects of indepen-
dent variables on different forms of gambling. They find gambling to be a normal
good and reject the hypothesis of gambling being a social demerit. Additionally,
their results again confirm most of our findings. They show that the propensity to
gamble is smaller for females and higher educated individuals but higher for civil
servants than other occupational groups. Our findings differ in that they observe a
negative coefficient for home-ownership. However, they only estimate the probabil-
ity of participation (by a probit model). Thus, the study provides no information
about the outcome of the amount decision. Therefore, our findings contribute to
research on gambling behaviour in Germany as we analyse gambling in general and
use techniques which incorporate censored data issues while obtaining the marginal
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effects on actual expenditure rather than just participation.
Furthermore, this paper also contributes to the empirical literature on consumption
in a more general sense. Empirical demand and consumption analyses often face
censored data. Other than gambling, there are numerous non-indispensable goods
such as tobacco, alcoholic beverages, health care, luxury goods or recreational ac-
tivities which a high fraction of individuals not consuming at all.30 All of these
studies face the same issue of how to deal with censored data as we do with the data
on gambling expenditure. Some papers bypass the issue altogether by estimating
binary choice models of consumption.31 These studies produce marginal effects on
the participation decision but fail to derive marginal effects on the amount spent.
For most goods though, the amount of the expenditure is of interest, rather than
just the mere purchasing decision. For example, concerning gambling expenditure
one should distinguish between small and high stake players and take the frequency
of playing into account. Powell et al. (1999) find that the traits of high stake and
excessive gamblers differ to those from occasional or one-time players. Thus, it is of
interest to examine what influences the frequency and amount decision.
In order to produce marginal effects for both the participation and the amount
decision, typically Tobit or Hurdle models are used with censored data. The cal-
culated marginal effects provide information on both Prob(y > 0|x) and E(y|x).
These models rely on the assumption of homoskedastic and normally distributed
errors. However, it is fairly common to observe heteroskedasticity in any estimation
on a sample as large as the EVS. Thus, many researchers face the problem of het-
eroskedasticty. To overcome this problem, a robust estimator, such as the CLAD
estimator, can be employed. Though, while it produces robust estimation results,
the coefficients are of no informative value regarding the marginal effects on the ob-
served outcome. This constitutes a trade-off between retrieving the marginal effects
of interest and estimating a robust model. This paper provides an approach of how
to proceed if heteroskedasticity is found when applying Tobit models. Although
the regression of the Tobit model suffers from heteroskedasticity and non-normality,
the similarity of the results of heteroskedasticity robust estimations suggest their
validity. This allows us to interpret the marginal effects calculated from the Tobit
model, albeit just in an approximative quality.
30An overview of empirical studies of consumer demand is provided in Rebeggiani 2007, Chapter
4. On leisure demand, see e.g Pawlowski and Breuer 2012. The demand for tobacco is modelled
e.g. by Aristei and Pieroni 2008.
31See, among many others, the already cited paper by Albers and Hu¨bl 1997, or Fu and
Florkowski 2016 on tobacco and alcohol demand.
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7.2 Suggestions for Further Research
Empirical literature on gambling demand typically focuses on household determi-
nants of gambling behaviour (e.g. Gandullia and Leporatti 2017, Kitchen and Pow-
ells 1991, Tan et al. 2010 or Worthington et al. 2003 and 2007, among others). This
is mostly due to the fact that data on (gambling) expenditure is commonly only
available at the household level. When analysing the influence of individual traits,
the household head serves as the base for individual characteristics. Accordingly,
it is implicitly assumed that neither another household member gambles nor are
the characteristics of other household members incorporated into the analysis. This
harbours inaccuracies. In addition, the analysis on the individual level is important
since it grants more insights into the distinctive motivation and determinants of
gambling behaviour than an analysis of the whole household does. In the case of
gambling, the implicit assumption that only the household head gambles flaws the
results especially for married couples. For once, it is assumed that spouses of the
household head do not participate in any gambling activity at all. Assuming that
most household heads in samples are male, this systematically understates the gam-
bling participation of women. Further, if household heads are female, these women
often are single parents. As MacDonald et al. (2004) find, lone parents gamble less
than married individuals. This advances the underestimation of female gambling
expenditure. As a consequence, the approach of attributing all expenditures solely
to the household head leads to inaccuracies in the analysis. This problem persists
with nearly all empirical demand studies concerning the consumption of divisible
goods. For example, if one considers expenditures on clothes, there are likely to be
substantial differences in attitudes and willingness to pay of individual household
members.
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, representative data on individual expenditure
is scarcely available. Commonly, microeconomic data on expenditures is only ac-
cessible on the household level. In most of these samples, individual socio-economic
and demographic information exists only for the household head. Thus, studies of
demand behaviour are usually conducted at the household level, where the house-
hold serves as a consumption entity. In theoretical literature on demand this is
called the unitary model. Doss (1996) rejects the unitary model and proposes more
flexible models that allow for intra-household dynamics. Therefore, we propose that
further research is needed to analyse individual rather than household (gambling)
expenditure.
Another point of concern is the lack of differentiation of gambling expenditures in
the EVS data. As findings by Albers and Hu¨bl (1997) suggest, the demographic
and socio-economic determinants of gambling participation differ for specific gam-
bling products. For example, they find that being male has a negative effect on the
propensity to play TV-lottery while it has a positive effect on on the participation
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decision to use gambling machines or visit casinos. Furthermore, most of the coeffi-
cients in their regression show the same signs but the magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients differ. Thus, there is a difference in the determinants of gambling be-
haviour for different gambling products. For policy-makers it is of importance to be
able to differentiate between the drivers of gambling demand of specific products.
Some gambling products might be more socially desirable while others create more
severe negative externalities. In order to decide on policies specific to a certain
gambling product, findings on the determinants of gambling expenditure on each
individual gambling product are required.
Furthermore, the lack of differentiation of the types of gambling in the EVS data
makes it difficult to compare the results obtained here to the literature about risk
attitudes. There are differences in the risk attitudes of gamblers who choose spe-
cific games (Albers and Hu¨bl 1997). The riskiness of a stake varies greatly with
the chosen product. For example, compare a 6-out-of-49 lottery to roulette. While
the lottery provides a low winning probability, the stakes are low and the poten-
tial winnings very high. On the other hand, the winning probability in a game
of roulette is considerably higher, while the potential winning is lower. Thus, the
(perceived) risk of gambling is dependent on the game played. However, the EVS
yields no information on the riskiness of the gambles the individuals participated in.
Therefore, one cannot extend the marginal effects found on gambling expenditure
to the willingness to take risks or risk attitudes in general. Nonetheless, it would be
of interest to retrieve the effects of socio-demographic and socio-economic variables
on differentiated gambling products for which the risk is known.
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A.1 Summary Statistics of the EVS 2013
Table 7: Summary statistics of the EVS 2013
Mean Sd Min Max
Demographic characteristics
Hh head is female .38 .49
Age of hh head 53.32 15.73 19 95
Hh head is married∗ .52 .50
Number of children <18 years .35 .76 0 7
Hh head is Christian∗∗ .31 .46
Hh owns house/apartment .51 .50
Hh living in a city∗∗∗ .31 .46
Hh lives in the new federal territory† .24 .43
Socio-economic characteristics
Hh head completed Abitur‡ .48 .50
Hh head is unemployed .05 .21
Hh head is self-employed .04 .19
Hh head is a civil servant .09 .28
Hh head is retired .31 .46
Household income (in e)
Gross hh income 4,496.5 2,967.5 56.7 29,832.0
Net hh income 3,461.2 2,111.4 7.3 17,892.7
Household expenditures (in e)
Total 5,642.8 6,283.2 407.3 176,254.7
Gambling 11.7 29.8 0 1,682.7
Groceries 318.9 175.0 0 2,061.0
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 44.8 63.0 0 809.7
Health products 129.3 352.6 0 11,179.33
Private consumption 2,690.8 1,706.7 269.7 25,998.3
Educational purposes 22.8 89.2 0 3,748.7
Observations 42,775
The table displays the summary statistics for selected variables of the EVS 2013.
Information on individual characteristics is only displayed for the household head.
* Including civil unions
** Equal to one if hh head pays church tax
*** Classified as a municipality with a population of 100,000 or more
† Including Berlin
‡ Includes both the German university entrance diploma (Abitur) and the advanced
technical college entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife)
Table 7 displays the most important summary statistics of the EVS 2013 wave.
Information on individual characteristics is only displayed for the household head.
Around 38 % of all household heads are female and the average age of the household
head is around 53 years. About half of the sample households are married with
I
an average of 0.35 children per household. Around half of the households live in
their own residential property. 31 % of the households live in municipalities with
a populations of 100,000 or more and about one quarter live in the new federal
territories (including Berlin). Most of the household heads are employed (51 %)
while 31 % are retired, 9 % are civil servants, 4 % are self-employed and 5 % are
unemployed (including housewives and househusbands). The household heads in
the sample seem to be rather educated, with 48 % who completed the university en-
trance diploma (Abitur) or the the advanced technical college entrance qualification
(Fachhochschulreife). The income and expenditure values differ greatly within the
sample. On average households earned a gross income of e5,642.8 and a net income
of e3,461.2, with (standard deviations of e2,967.5 and e2,111.4, respectively). The
figures on total household expenditure exceed those of income with an average of
e5,642.8. Figures on expenditures on other specific goods can also be seen in Table
7.
A.2 Distribution of Net Income
Figures 4 and 5 depict the distribution of net household income and the logarithm
of net household income. The blue lines represent the normal distribution. The dis-
tribution of net household income is skewed and not normally distributed. One can
clearly see that by taking the logarithm of net income the distribution approximates
a normal distribution to a much grater extent.
Figure 4: Distribution of net income
across the sample
Figure 5: Distribution of logarithmic
net income across sample
II
A.3 Means of Household (Head) Characteristics for Differ-
ent Subsamples
Table 8: Means of household (head) characteristics of the full and restricted sample
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Bottom 99 % Top 1 %
Hh head is female 0.38 0.38 0.25
Age of hh head 53.32 53.26 59.92
Hh head is married 0.52 0.52 0.63
Children <18 years 0.35 0.35 0.15
Net hh income (in e) 3461 3452 4339
Hh head completed Abitur 0.48 0.44 0.48
Hh head is unemployed 0.045 0.045 0.019
HH head is self-employed 0.038 0.028 0.038
Hh head is a civil servant 0.088 0.088 0.11
HH head is retired 0.311 0.42 0.31
The table displays the means of household (head) characteristics of observa-
tions for the full sample (1), the first 99 percentiles of gambling expenditure
(2) and the highest one percent of gambling expenditures (3).
III
B Additional Regression Results
B.1 OLS Regression Results
Table 9: OLS regression results
Full Restricted
Sample Sample
Hh head is female -2.948∗∗∗ -1.924∗∗∗
(-8.87) (-9.10)
Age of hh head 0.595∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(9.63) (12.16)
Age of hh head squared -0.00399∗∗∗ -0.00337∗∗∗
(-6.58) (-8.73)
Hh head is married 0.133 1.043∗∗∗
(0.36) (4.38)
Number of children <18 years -2.968∗∗∗ -2.276∗∗∗
(-13.99) (-16.90)
Hh lives in a city -0.0799 -0.0742
(-0.25) (-0.36)
Log net income 7.084∗∗∗ 4.656∗∗∗
(21.47) (22.17)
Hh head completed university -2.336∗∗∗ -2.016∗∗∗
entrance diploma (-7.69) (-10.44)
Hh head is unemployed -0.613 -1.228∗∗
(-0.82) (-2.59)
Hh head is selfemployed -0.427 -1.271∗∗
(-0.56) (-2.64)
Hh head is a civil servant 1.048∗ 0.764∗
(2.00) (2.29)
Hh head is retired 1.238∗ 1.098∗∗
(2.23) (3.11)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table displays the results of an OLS regression on the full
sample (1) and on the sample restricted to the first 99 percentiles
of average average monthly gambling expenditure (2). The depen-
dent variable is average monthly gambling expenditure.
IV
B.2 Tobit Model with Continuous Endogenous Covariates
Table 10: Regression results of a Tobit model with instrumental variables
Dep. variable: Av. monthly hh gambling expenditure
Tobit IV
Monthly net hh income 0.00172∗∗∗
(7.14)
Hh head is female -4.994∗∗∗
(-10.20)
Age of hh head 1.621∗∗∗
(17.63)
Age of hh head squared -0.0119∗∗∗
(-13.30)
Hh head is married 4.020∗∗∗
(7.01)
Children <18 years -4.192∗∗∗
(-13.57)
Hh lives in a city -1.199∗∗
(-2.61)
Hh head completed university -5.153∗∗∗
entrance diploma (-11.03)
Hh head is unemployed -12.68∗∗∗
(-11.29)
Hh head is self-employed -6.218∗∗∗
(-5.45)
Hh head is a civil servant 3.025∗∗∗
(4.05)
Hh head is retired -0.488
(-0.62)







t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table displays the results of a Tobit regression with con-
tinuous endogenous regressors on the restricted sample of the
bottom 99 percentiles of the distribution of average monthly
household gambling expenditures. The dependent variable is
average monthly household gambling expenditures. Income
tax is used as an instrument for net income.
V
C Marginal Effects on Average Monthly House-
hold Gambling Expenditure
C.1 Marginal Effects of the Tobit Regression at Different
Values of Age
Table 11: Marginal effects of the Tobit regression at different values of age
Age of the household head
20 30 40 50 60 70
Hh head is female -1.258 -2.012 -2.804 -3.482 -3.953 -4.220
Age of hh head 0.455 0.728 1.015 1.260 1.431 1.527
Age of hh head squared -0.00337 -0.00539 -0.00751 -0.00932 -0.0106 -0.0113
Hh head is married 0.509 0.814 1.135 1.409 1.599 1.707
Children <18 years -1.287 -2.058 -2.868 -3.560 -4.042 -4.315
Log(net income) 3.292 5.265 7.337 9.108 10.34 11.04
Hh head completed the Abitur -1.729 -2.765 -3.853 -4.783 -5.431 -5.798
Hh head is unemployed -2.021 -3.232 -4.504 -5.591 -6.348 -6.777
Hh head is self-employed -1.423 -2.275 -3.170 -3.936 -4.469 -4.771
Hh head is a civil servant 0.641 1.025 1.428 1.773 2.013 2.149
HH head is retired 0.501 0.801 1.116 1.385 1.573 1.679
The table displays the marginal effects of the regressors x on the observed outcome conditional on
x, (y|x) at different values of the age of the household head. The marginal effects are calculated
from Tobit regression (2) in Table 3. The marginal effects are given for a discrete change of the
dummy variable from 0 to 1 (incl. number of children). The discrete variables are evaluated at
their means 3,091.14 (age2) and 7.97 (log income). All marginal effects are significant (at least)
at the 5 % level.
VI
C.2 Marginal Effects of the Tobit Regression at Different
Values of Household Net Income
Table 12: Marginal effects of the Tobit regression at different values of household
income
Average net household net income (in e)
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Hh head is female -1.458 -1.840 -2.073 -2.240 -2.370
Age of hh head 0.528 0.666 0.750 0.811 0.858
Age of hh head squared -0.00390 -0.00492 -0.00555 -0.00600 -0.00634
Hh head is married 0.590 0.744 0.839 0.906 0.959
Children <18 years -1.491 -1.881 -2.120 -2.290 -2.423
Hh lives in a city -0.410 -0.517 -0.583 -0.629 -0.666
Log(net income) 3.814 4.813 5.423 5.860 6.199
Hh head completed the Abitur -2.003 -2.527 -2.848 -3.077 -3.255
Hh head is unemployed -2.341 -2.954 -3.329 -3.597 -3.805
Hh head is self-employed -1.648 -2.080 -2.343 -2.532 -2.679
Hh head is a civil servant 0.742 0.937 1.055 1.141 1.207
Hh head is retired 0.580 0.732 0.825 0.891 0.943
The table displays the marginal effects of the regressors x on the observed outcome
conditional on x, (y|x) at different values of net household income. The marginal effects
are calculated from Tobit regression (2) in Table 3. The marginal effects are given for
a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1 (incl. number of children). Ahe of
the household head is evaluated at its mean 53.33. All marginal effects are significant
(at least) at the 5 % level.
VII
C.3 Marginal Effects of the Tobit Regression by Gender of
the Household Head
Table 13: Marginal effects of the Tobit regression by gender of the household heads
Gender of the household head
Male Female
Gender of hh head -2.048 -1.829
Age of hh head 0.741 0.662
Age of hh head squared -0.00548 -0.00486
Hh head is married 0.829 0.740
Children <18 years -2.094 -1.870
Hh lives in a city -0.576 -0.514
Log(net income) 5.358 4.784
Hh head completed the Abitur -2.814 -2.512
HH head is unemployed -3.289 -2.936
Hh head is self-employed -2.315 -2.067
Hh head is a civil servant 1.043 0.931
HH head is retired 0.815 0.727
The table displays the marginal effects of the regressors x on the
observed outcome conditional on x, (y|x) for whether the house-
hold head is male of female. The marginal effects are calculated
from Tobit regression (2) in Table 3. The marginal effects are
given for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1
(incl. number of children). The discrete variables are evaluated
at their means 53.33 (age), 3,091.14 (age2) and 7.97 (log income).
All marginal effects are significant (at least) at the 5 % level.
VIII
